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THE SIX-TIER COMMUNICATION GAP  
FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AFTER  
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: LESSONS LEARNED 
FROM THE CASE OF DURACELL AND NANFU
AbstrAct
The importance of cultural factors as antecedents of post-acquisition integra-
tion has been recognized in previous research. Nevertheless, there are not 
many case studies on the post–merger and acquisition (M&A) integration 
process of USA-based multinational corporations (MNCs) acquiring Chinese 
companies. This article summarizes lessons in communication learned from 
the integration process between Duracell and Nanfu, the two battery giants 
from the US and China. In 2003, the Gillette Company, who owned Duracell, 
acquired Nanfu. In 2005, Gillette was acquired by Procter and Gamble (P&G), 
and the management of Nanfu remains to be coordinated by Duracell. This 
case embodies the interplay of two national cultures (China and the US) and 
four organizational cultures (P&G, Gillette, Duracell, and Nanfu). Data from 
interviews and participant observations with American and Chinese managers 
and engineers, and Chinese consumers indicate a complex post-acquisition 
integration process. The article proposes a six-tier American-Chinese com-
munication gap to be overcome for any MNCs in their post-acquisition inte-
gration after cross-border transactions between the US and China: Directness 
vs. Subtleness; Aggressiveness vs. Modesty; Courtesy vs. Command; Different 
connotations of the same concepts; Competitive vs. Obliging Conflict Man-
agement Styles; “Rule-based” vs. “Good will-based” working atmosphere. 
The case study on the Duracell-Nanfu case demonstrates that MNCs need to 
provide comprehensive intercultural training for its multinational teams for 
more effective communication and higher productivity after M&As. 
Keywords: Chinese culture, American culture, M&A (merger and 
acquisition), P&G (Procter and Gamble), Duracell, Nanfu, post-acquisition 
integration, cross-border transactions, communication gap
PArt I: IntroductIon
Since the 1990s, following the deepening of the economic reform and de-
regulation of the market in Mainland China, acquiring established Chinese 
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companies has become a shortcut for international companies to quickly 
establish a strong market position in China. However, for multinational cor-
porations (MNCs), mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in China are particularly 
challenging. To be successful, MNCs operating globally need to overcome 
challenges in dealing with different cultures, languages, rules and regulations, 
and tax systems. Misunderstandings in communication and culture can lead 
to conflict and financial losses. 
In 2003, the Gillette Company, owner of the world’s top consumer bat-
tery brand Duracell, took over a controlling stake of up to 70% in Fujian 
Nanping Nanfu Battery Co., Ltd., located in southern China. The acquisition 
gave Gillette a top Chinese battery brand of Nanfu (南孚), a state-of-the-art 
manufacturing plant, and a national distribution network with over 3 million 
retail outlets throughout China. In addition, the acquisition gave Gillette a 
dominant position in China’s battery market, since Nanfu accounts for more 
than 40% of China’s alkaline battery sales (Battery grant, 2003). Prior to 2003, 
Duracell was an insignificant player in the Chinese battery market, occupying 
only 10% of the market share. Two years later, in 2005, Procter and Gamble 
(P&G) acquired Gillette. Consequently, P&G gained control of the majority 
of shares of Nanfu. Both Gillette and P&G gave Duracell leadership power 
over Nanfu, making Duracell the de facto “supervisor” for Nanfu since its 
acquisition in 2003. However, in the eyes of the Chinese management team at 
Nanfu, Duracell was a former inferior competitor who became the “supervi-
sor” of Nanfu through acquisition. This fact was hard to accept. Interview 
data shows that this attitude from the Nanfu side, and the lack of sufficient 
communication between Duracell and Nanfu in post-acquisition integration, 
created much misunderstanding and operational conflict between the two 
companies for many years. 
“Mergers fail more often than marriages,” said Voigt (2009). While the cur-
rent divorce rates vary between 40% and 59% in North America and Western 
Europe (Divorces, 2013), 70% of M&As fail to increase shareholder values 
worldwide (Mohibullah, 2009). A study by the Hay Group (2007) found that 
more than 90% of M&As in Europe fail to reach financial goals. Researchers 
agree that M&As fail frequently (Dauber, 2011; Hofstede, 2010; Mohibullah, 
2009). Most analysts found the incompatibility of the two partnering corpo-
rate cultures to be the most significant reason for their breakdown (Uljin, 
Duysters, & Fevre, 2010). Was the acquisition of Nanfu by Gillette a smart 
decision? Were there any intercultural business communication challenges 
between the Chinese teams and the American teams after the acquisition? I 
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conducted a seven-year longitudinal study from 2007 to 2013 on the Duracell-
Nanfu case and my findings illustrate the lessons in communication learned 
from this M&A.
The purpose of this article is three fold: First, it focuses on the post-
acquisition integration process by analyzing the case of Gillette, Duracell’s 
parent company, acquiring the Chinese company Nanfu in 2003. This process 
implied the interplay of two national cultures (Chinese and American) and 
four organizational cultures (Duracell, Gillette, P&G, Nanfu). Second, this 
article reveals opportunities and challenges in post-acquisition integration 
in the Chinese marketplace through the study of the Duracell-Nanfu case. 
Finally, it seeks to identify cultural elements that contribute to intercultural 
communication gaps between the Chinese teams and the American teams 
after a M&A. The lesson learned in this case can be transferrable to other 
M&A cases that involve Chinese and American cultures.
The terms merger and acquisition need to be defined. An acquisition is 
defined as one company taking a controlling interest (over 50%) of another 
company, regardless of the sizes of the companies (Butler, Ferris, & Napier, 
1991). The term merger refers to a combination of equal-sized firms, in which 
no one party can clearly be seen as the acquirer (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; 
Søderberg & Vaara, 2003). Often in existing literature the two terms merger 
and acquisition are used interchangeably (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; 
Sarala, 2009). Teerikangas and Very (2006) argue that such loose definitions 
of mergers and acquisitions have led to an ill-defined focus in merger and 
acquisition studies. However, since the focus of this longitudinal study on 
the Duracell-Nanfu integration case is on the integration of two companies 
rather than on the control factor, relevant literature in both mergers and ac-
quisitions was consulted. 
PArt II: reseArch Method
Although the acquisition of Nanfu by Gillette for Duracell happened in 2003, a 
literature survey showed that there are no extensive and specific investigations 
on this acquisition regarding the challenges in communication involved in 
the post-acquisition integration process. In global business and intercultural 
communication analyses, case study is a widely used methodology when a 
holistic in-depth investigation is needed. To conduct case studies in an ef-
fective way, many different methodologies have been developed, such as 
grounded theory, survey research, focus groups, or content analysis. Case 
studies require a multi-perspective analysis, and thus triangulation of methods 
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is commonly used. Given the nature of this study, the triangulation method-
ology was adopted (Yin, 2003). Four sources of data were used, combining 
secondary data, in-depth interviews, and participant observation: 
• Information from official websites: Nanfu Batteries (http://www.nanfu.
com/en), Duracell (http://www.duracell.com), Gillette (http://www.gillette.
com), and P&G (http://www.pg.com). 
• Online secondary data from both English and Chinese websites: Though 
online information may have credibility issues, I used information from well-
known and credible sites. China Daily, The People’s Daily, Sohu Finance, 
and The Wall Street Journal are among those online sources quoted. 
 • In-depth interview data: From 2007 to 2011, in a span of 5 years, a total 
of 43 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with top execu-
tives and engineers at both Duracell and Nanfu, as well as with electronics 
store managers and Chinese battery consumers in China. (See table 1 for 
interviewee distribution.)
tAble 1: IntervIewee dIstrIbutIon
Interview 
totals: 43
Position Time of  
Interview
Location of  
Interview
3 Midlevel Managers, Nanfu July 2007 Nanping, China
2 Managers, R&D Division, Nanfu July 2008 Nanping, China
10 Engineers, Nanfu July 2008 Nanping, China
1 Corporate Executive, Gillette May 2007 LaGrange, GA, 
USA













1 White Elephant Battery Manager July 2007 Shanghai, China
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• Notes from participant observation: From 2007 to 2011, I was invited 
as a consultant to teach effective intercultural communication in Georgia 
(USA) and in China. I took detailed notes while observing the progression 
of integration involving Duracell, Nanfu, Gillette, and P&G.
PArt III: reseArch FIndIngs
Good-Enough Market for Nanfu in China
Historically, MNCs have focused on China’s premium markets, and  Duracell’s 
market positioning was no exception in 2003. However, MNCs sticking 
with a premium-only strategy are increasingly under attack from Chinese 
competitors with a compelling offering: fairly reliable products at prices 
low enough to attract China’s growing ranks of mid-level consumers. In 
fact, in the mid-2000s, the “good-enough market,” which was a huge seg-
ment of lower-end—but acceptable—products, with unbeatable prices, was 
emerging in China. Indeed, China’s middle market is growing faster than 
both the premium and low-end segments (see figure 1). In some categories, 
the “good-enough market” accounts for nearly half of all revenues (Gadiesh 
& Vestring, 2006).
Figure 1: Market segmentation based on product quality
After the acquisition of Nanfu in 2003, Gillette protected both Duracell’s 
and Nanfu’s brands in their respective segments, and leveraged cost syner-
gies, economies of scale, and superior distribution to significantly increase 
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operating margins in China. “The two have their own product features and 
brand value. I guess, Gillette won’t kill the Nanfu brand since Nanfu has a 
significant number of loyal customers in China,” said Mr. Miao Xiushu of 
Shanghai White Elephant Swan Battery Co., Ltd. in 2003. Gillette continued 
to sell premium batteries under the Duracell brand, and maintained Nanfu 
as the leading national brand for the mass market, the good-enough market. 
Dual branding, cost synergies, broadened product portfolio, and distribution 
to more than 3 million retail outlets in China was successful for Gillette.
In addition, to maintain Duracell and Nanfu each in its position, the Gil-
lette Company and P&G needed to restrain Nanfu’s global ambition. As the 
“national power,” it had planned overseas expansion. Nanfu was advised by 
Duracell to focus on the domestic Chinese market, to avoid head-on competi-
tion with Duracell in the foreign market (Boarding the pirate ship, 2005). For 
some Chinese intellectuals, Nanfu’s eventual acquisition by P&G was seen 
as a tragedy of “National Power.” It was said that in 1999, Nanfu was forced 
to seek a Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by the local Nanping government, 
even in the context of no additional funding needed. However, the local gov-
ernment said: “Nanfu is still in Nanping, and it still generates jobs and tax 
to the local economy. We are pleased with that result” (Nanfu battery, 2013).
Six-Tier Communication Gap
In 2003 when Nanfu was acquired by Gillette, Nanfu owned 40% of the 
market share in battery products in China. Interview data shows that in the 
perspective of the Nanfu management team, Nanfu was acquired by Gillette, 
partly because Duracell could not compete with Nanfu in market share and 
product price. In 2007, Duracell occupied only 10% of the Chinese market. 
However, P&G gave 100% coordination authority to Duracell to manage 
Nanfu. Since Nanfu “belonged” to Duracell, Nanfu was somewhat forced 
to purchase high cost equipment within fiscal years by spending “The Year 
End Fund.” Nanfu’s Research and Development (R&D) managers were not 
happy, and I observed this incident at a Nanfu factory campus in China. 
The Nanfu team’s argument was that Nanfu had been following the Chinese 
value of frugality, and the company had been able to keep a low cost and 
high yield production. However, after many rounds of bilingual reports to 
the US Duracell headquarters, Nanfu’s purchasing department was obliged 
to follow the Americans’ directives and purchase expensive equipment made 
in Pennsylvania, USA. Nanfu R&D managers were worried about losing 
their efficiency in low-cost production, but they lacked the channel for ex-
pressing themselves. They faced “powerful” American bosses, and did not 
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want to challenge their authority. After the acquisition by Gillette in 2003, 
many sets of equipment were purchased, but not used at Nanfu (Boarding 
the pirate ship, 2005).
Intercultural misunderstandings and conflicts were omnipresent in daily 
communication between managers and engineers from Duracell and Nanfu 
for over ten years. The interview data and participant observation notes un-
covered a six-tier intercultural communication gap between the two teams 
from the American and Chinese cultures. These were directness-subtleness, 
aggressiveness-modesty, courtesy-command, different interpretations of 
concepts, competitive-obliging, and rule-based vs. good-will-based work-
ing atmosphere. The in-depth interviews revealed that the different belief 
systems of the Chinese and Americans affected the ways they behaved and 
communicated in the post-M&A integration process.
Tier #1: Directness (US) vs. Subtleness (China)
Gudykunst and Kim (2003) state that people who have Asian languages as 
their first language tend to communicate in a more indirect fashion when 
speaking English. The Chinese appear to be subtle and ambiguous in their 
expression partly because the Chinese communication style is high-context 
oriented (Hall, 1976), with most of the information embedded in the physical 
context or internalized in the person, and very little in the coded message. 
In the Chinese culture, what is most important is sometimes not said, and 
subtlety is valued as a virtue. On the contrary, Americans are more direct in 
communication (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003). As a result, subtle meanings that 
the Chinese try to convey might be ignored or misunderstood by American 
partners, and a straightforward expression of the Americans may be over-
analyzed by the Chinese in their subtle mindset. Consequently, the subtleness 
of the Chinese communication style becomes a communication obstacle.
Liu, a 38-year-old researcher at Nanfu said: “I think that Americans are 
more open than us. It is easy to communicate with Americans because they 
are direct. They will tell you either they agree with you or disagree with 
you frankly.” James, a 42-year-old manager from Nanfu agreed: “I think 
Americans are very straightforward. There are fewer mind games going on.” 
In summary, the Chinese perceive a multi-layered explanation contained in 
their American employers’ expressions. With a relatively indirect thinking 
pattern, the Chinese might face challenges when working with Americans. 
Chinese employees need to be aware of the more open, direct, and linear 
style of communication used by their American colleagues and supervisors. 
At the same time, American supervisors should consider the complex ways 
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of interpreting messages of the Chinese employees and try to understand 
inevitable communication problems. 
Tier #2: Aggressiveness (US) vs. Modesty (China)
According to Hofstede (1980), one way in which Asian cultures are differ-
ent from American culture is in individualism-collectivism. US culture is 
individualistic, whereas Asian cultures are collectivistic. In individualistic 
cultures, individuals take precedence over groups; in collectivistic cultures, 
groups take precedence over individuals. Consequently, while Americans 
communicate assertively, the Chinese tend to be modest in talking about 
themselves. Moreover, in a collectivist culture, one is encouraged to talk 
about the group rather than oneself. A talkative person, with no “true knowl-
edge,” is sometimes characterized as a “noisy half-filled vinegar bottle” who 
is criticized by the public. Such popular Chinese sayings as “Eloquence may 
be silver, but silence is gold” influence the Chinese mindset. 
Valuing silence and modesty can be an issue for a Chinese team working 
with American bosses and colleagues. Modest Chinese colleagues might ap-
pear to be humble, timid, or shy. Usually Chinese employees feel inhibited 
from talking about themselves and offering constructive opinions. At corporate 
meetings, one’s strength is partly dependent on his/her self-marketing skill. 
If this skill is underdeveloped for cultural reasons, the synergy between the 
Chinese and American employees cannot grow. In collectivistic societies such 
as China, people are hierarchically related, and social interaction is strongly 
defined by age, gender, and social status. As a result, Chinese employees 
listen to American employers respectfully without asserting themselves. This 
tendency can be a hindrance for American supervisors in recognizing Chinese 
employees’ accomplishments, as well as their creativity. 
Tier #3: Courtesy (US) vs. Command (China)
Power distance is another typology in Hofstede’s (1980) 5 dimensions of 
cultural differences. Power distance measures the extent to which inequali-
ties among people are seen as normal and accepted at different hierarchical 
layers of a society. On this index, the Chinese culture scores high, while the 
American culture scores low. The hierarchical Confucian world-order influ-
ences the Chinese to practice a command-obey format of communication, 
commonly in a downward direction, when a task is given. Interview data 
shows that this tendency was recognized by some of the American employees 
when they were communicating with their Chinese counterparts. The Chi-
nese might choose a seemingly blunt, simple, and unpolished “command” 
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style of speech in an interaction, such as: “You should do this!” “Tell me as 
soon as possible!” “When will you make a decision?” To Americans, such 
expressions lack politeness. 
On the contrary, in a low-power-distance culture like the US, people strive 
to treat each other with courtesy. Individuals typically attempt to address 
each other as equals in a horizontal, rather than hierarchical structure. When 
Americans give suggestions, they strive not to be authoritative: “If I were you, 
I would …” or “I suggest …” or “In my opinion, you might want to consider 
…” Therefore, to Americans, Chinese appear to be blunt and insensitive 
to word choice, and the Chinese team might offend their co-workers from 
America by using too much of the command style of expression. In 2008, 
Nick, a 47-year-old engineer from South Carolina who worked for Duracell, 
was sent to Nanping, China, once every two weeks to work with the Chinese 
team. When he was not in China, he communicated with his Chinese coun-
terparts via email, in English. Nick complained: “I am a Southern gentleman, 
and all throughout my life, nobody has ever given me commands about what 
I ‘should’ do. However, I often receive emails from China, starting with such 
phrases, telling me I should do this, or I should do that.” Chris from Atlanta 
echoed: “I think Chinese are sometimes too abrupt …” Americans would say, 
“If I were you, I would do this, but the Chinese don’t. It is more courteous. 
This might be superficial, but courtesy makes people feel better.” For all of 
the Chinese employees who communicate with Americans, English is a sec-
ond language. Most of them are not proficient in English, and have a limited 
vocabulary. Since Americans from Duracell usually do not speak Chinese, 
English is the only language of communication. To the Chinese, a phrase like 
“You should …” is simply a way to make their meaning clear, not knowing 
that it causes more confusion from the American standpoint. 
Tier #4: Different connotations of the same concepts
Usually, foreign visitors lack first-hand experience and knowledge about the 
local culture, which creates an obstacle in understanding each other, even when 
the language is not a barrier. When Americans work in China, they lack first-
hand Chinese experience. Such a deficiency posed a challenge for the Chinese 
and American teams in daily interactions. Such a gap is difficult to bridge, 
even if one strives to do so by reading books and consulting other sources. 
Kyle, a 44-year-old manager from Duracell, reminded me that intercultural 
life differences may be a global teamwork obstacle: “On my business trips 
to China, I just feel like I have very limited common topics with them, such 
as everyday casual things that you share … I actually want to catch up with 
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them. However, our different life experiences present different pictures for 
the same word. For example, in China, when they mention ‘lunch,’ I would 
quickly think of a sandwich or a hamburger, whereas my Chinese colleagues 
might have the image of a fish floating in a hot pot.” Thirty-year-old Mr. 
Zhen from Nanfu suggested that American engineers and managers needed 
to learn more about Chinese customs and respect the local Fujian culture, in 
order not to offend people at Nanfu. He suggested: “I think you need to pay 
attention to Chinese culture, family, history, our food culture, our respect for 
elders, and learn some Chinese language. I, personally, enjoy learning about 
such topics, about America in general. Like this, you can find lots of com-
mon topics with your Chinese colleagues.” Although it is a fact that Chinese 
and American team members grew up in different cultural contexts, it is 
still possible for both parties to learn about each other’s cultures and values. 
With much American popular culture being globalized, it can be a functional 
topic when communicating with younger Chinese people. The interview 
data shows that the younger generation in China is quite familiar with such 
topics as the NBA, Hollywood movies, the Rolling Stones’ music, and top 
American brand names. In the meantime, it is helpful for Americans to learn 
some Chinese culture and respect local traditions. The interview data shows 
that Chinese employees of Nanfu in Nanping had unfavorable impressions 
of some American expatriates from Duracell, who spent most of their leisure 
time in Fuzhou, the nearby metropolitan city, instead of being with their 
Chinese team members in rural Nanping. 
Tier #5: Competitive (US) vs. Obliging (China)  
Conflict Management Styles
While I was doing research in Nanfu in 2007, I learned that the conflict in 
management style differences between the Chinese and Americans was hard 
to reconcile. Being modest and obliging is a traditional virtue in China, while 
being competitive is a common Western, especially American, practice when 
dealing with conflict. Chinese companies tend to take the underdog position in 
international conflict and pay the price “for peace.” Ting-Toomey, Gao, Yang, 
Kim, Lin, and Nishida (1991) suggest that these two orientations are based on 
different cultural values involving identity and face saving. One particularly 
sensitive issue is deciding upon expenses. Since Nanfu is “supervised” by 
Duracell, Nanfu is forced to adopt the “expensive” habits of Duracell, even 
though Nanfu’s managers would do otherwise. The purchase of expensive 
US equipment put Nanfu R&D managers in a difficult situation, since their 
non-confrontational management style together with the perception of “im-
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posing” American behavior contradicts their principles of non-competing and 
hierarchy-differing styles of interaction.
In international transaction and conflict management, if Chinese corpora-
tions maintain an attitude of being obliged, their Western counterparts will 
become even more aggressive. Perhaps the Chinese companies need to re-
examine their modesty tradition and adopt more competitive management 
skills.
Tier #6: “Rule-based” (US) vs. “Good will-based” (China)  
working atmospheres
While Americans stick to the agreed-upon rules and procedures, the Chinese 
put more faith in personal relationships rather than in written rules and pro-
cedures. To avoid direct confrontation or losing “face” can lead to decisions 
that are made with no respect for rules. This is important information when 
doing business with the Chinese. In China, business becomes often secondary 
when a good social relationship must be established first. One cannot expect 
a contract before the social network is established. 
Mr. Zhang, a mid-level manager at Nanfu, said that they are not used to 
having their computers checked once a month by a third party, since they 
perceive this as a lack of trust by Duracell. It is unimaginable in China for 
managers’ computers to be checked by third parties, just to see whether they 
are loyal to the company. 
Mr. Wang, the Assistant to the General Manager, said that after the acqui-
sition, life changed. The managers of Nanfu had to write multiple reports in 
order to buy company cars, while in the past, they could make such minor 
decisions quickly. He said that to have a luxury company car can strengthen 
the “face” of the company and bring business deals. In China there is a rising 
class of nouveau riche, and one needs to have a luxury car, which is con-
sidered a successful-looking “Xingtou”1 (行头). Xingtou, a term borrowed 
from the Peking Opera, represents the totality of one’s appearance, including 
one’s clothing with brand names, watch, cell phone, and car. Such a total 
image creates a perception of success or failure for class-conscious business 
 1 Xingtou (行头): Peking Opera costumes are called Xingtou or, more popularly, 
Xifu (戏服) in Chinese. The origins of Peking Opera costumes can be traced back to 
the mid-fourteenth century, when operatic precursors first began to experiment with 
large, ornate articles of clothing. Such clothing is part of the total appearance of dif-
ferent characters (Xingtou, 2014). The interplay of “Xingtou” and “face” in Chinese 
culture fuels conspicuous consumption in China nowadays. 
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 partners and competitors. However, it was difficult for P&G to approve luxury 
company cars for Nanfu personnel because of fiscal regulations made in the 
US. The CEO of Nanfu downplayed his power: “I am just a professional 
manager, I am not a boss.” Many emerging Chinese companies operate based 
on interpersonal good will, while MNCs have a standardized set of rules. 
PArt Iv: conclusIons And dIscussIons
Most organizational changes generate stress due to misunderstanding 
and ambiguity. Mergers and acquisitions represent a particularly stressful 
change, given the large-scale nature of this transformation. The acquisition 
of the Chinese company Nanfu by the Gillette Company was a direct result 
of globalization, and the road to post-acquisition integration of Nanfu and 
Duracell was not smooth. However, individuals from different organizational 
and national cultures can be trained to overcome cultural barriers with in-
creased intercultural sensitivity (Hammer, Bennett, & Wiseman, 2003; Ben-
nett, 2009). At the same time, cultural differences can lead to learning and 
an increased knowledge base resulting from diversity. This is especially the 
case for international acquisitions where differences in beliefs, values, and 
practices may foster learning and innovation (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998). 
The central part of such learning is usually “knowledge transfer” (Bresman, 
Birkinshaw, & Nobel, 1999). For example, Duracell could have listened more 
to the management of Nanfu. If Nanfu has survived and thrived so well in the 
Chinese battery market, there is strength and a “niche” in this organizational 
culture. The new “parent company” can gain new ideas from the acquired 
companies, instead of imposing its own corporate culture unconditionally.
Vaara, Sarala, Stahl, & Bjorkman (2010) argue that different beliefs, values, 
and practices are related to the different forms of knowledge that may be useful 
for the other party. International acquisitions provide access to a potentially 
valuable repository of knowledge and capabilities embedded in the local 
environment of the merging organizations. Acquisitions in culturally distinct 
countries are more valuable because a greater cultural distance makes it more 
likely that the target firm will have capabilities that are significantly differ-
ent from the acquirer’s own set. Thus the two companies complement each 
other (Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998). In the case of Duracell and Nanfu, 
Nanfu certainly embodies local market knowledge of Chinese employees, 
consumers, and life styles. Duracell could have been more successful if its 
management had tried to learn more from Nanfu. 
Hammer et al. (2003) and Bennett (2009) propose a series of activities 
that can improve the cultural awareness of the employee. Among them is the 
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exposure to different organizational and national cultures. Some companies 
have already established informal activities such as Friday afternoon lunches, 
birthday parties, or weekend picnics. The employees from the acquired com-
pany can learn about these practices and be encouraged to participate. Another 
important opportunity is to offer employees from both companies the chance 
to create partnerships, such as dyads or teams for common projects. As such, 
they have the opportunity to develop a sense of closeness and trust, and to 
overcome unspoken animosities usually inherent in the post-integration pro-
cess. Moreover, leaders should appoint mid-level managers who are culturally 
sensitive (Hofstede, 2010). 
As most sources of conflict in the post-integration process are cultural in 
nature, Fink (2008) suggests that to increase the chances of success, one should 
try to hybridize a new organizational culture. “Hybridization is the process 
of blending organizational cultures and management knowledge to transform 
an acquisition into a new socially viable system with a sustainable culture” 
(p. 10). Tomlinson (1999) says that “hybridity” or cultural hybridization is a 
risky notion, as it is inherently associated with reinforcing and contradicting 
concepts, ideas, and themes. However, cultural hybridization is expected to 
bring positive and desirable effects to individuals and organizations (Dauber, 
2011; Shimoni, 2008). We hope that MNCs learn from this case, overcome 
the six tiers of cultural differences, and create a new hybrid organizational 
culture for the new company. 
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